15 UP-VW v. LUNA

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

15 UP-VW ENTERPRISES, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

JULIAN YANEZ LUNA, et al., Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0266
FILED 02-02-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2022-006206
CV2023-092213
The Honorable Christopher Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Evans, Dove, Nelson, Fish & Grier, PLC, Mesa
By Trevor J. Fish and Douglas N. Nelson
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Julian Yanez Luna, Phoenix
Defendant/Appellant

Sofia Cardoza Molina, Phoenix
Defendant/ Appellant
 15 UP-VW v. LUNA, et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Anni Hill Foster and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Julian Luna and Sofia Molina (Luna and Molina) appeal the
superior court’s judicial foreclosure of their interests in a property. They
argue they have a valid interest in the property because they bought it from
Juan Vega and his wife. But Mr. Vega’s purported sale was ineffective
because 15 UP-VW, not Mr. Vega, held legal title to the property. The court
thus affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I. The events leading up to this case began in December 2014 when
15 UP and the Vegas entered an Agreement For Sale.

¶2 Under the Agreement, 15 UP did not transfer legal title to the
Vegas. Instead, 15 UP agreed to transfer legal title to the Vegas if they made
timely payments of the full balance over the next 30 years. The parties
recorded the Agreement on January 15, 2015. Under the Agreement, the
Vegas held the property as community property, and both signed the
Agreement.

¶3 Section 12 of the Agreement restricted the Vegas’ right to
assign their contractual rights: “Purchaser shall not transfer, sell, or assign
its interest in the Property or this Agreement without Seller’s prior written
consent.” Section 11 of the Agreement also limited the Vegas’ ability to
transfer the property, saying:

In the event Purchaser attempts to sell, trade, exchange or
transfer Purchaser’s interest in the Property, the entire unpaid
balance of the Purchase Price, together with any other
amounts owned by Purchaser under this Agreement, shall be
immediately due and payable, unless Seller in its sole and
absolute discretion authorizes such a transfer in writing.

II. About 2 years later, the Vegas divorced and Mr. Vega entered a
Lease to Purchase Agreement with Luna and Molina for $110,000.

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¶4 When the Vegas divorced, the superior court ordered them to
sell the property and equally split any net proceeds. Though the Vegas’
community held the property, the Lease said Mr. Vega “is the fee owner”
of the property and would deliver “a special warranty deed conveying title
to the property” once Luna and Molina paid the entire $110,000. Mrs. Vega
did not sign the Lease. And Mr. Vega did not inform 15 UP of or involve it
in the Lease. Mr. Vega and Luna and Molina recorded the Lease on July 24,
2018.

¶5 About 4 years later (in 2022), Luna and Molina paid the entire
$110,000. Mr. Vega then executed and recorded a quitclaim deed,
purporting to convey his interest in the property over to Luna and Molina.
Mr. Vega and Luna and Molina recorded that deed. After that, 15 UP
learned of the Lease between Mr. Vega and Luna and Molina and sent the
Vegas a written Notice of Default and Demand for Cure and later a written
notice of acceleration under Section 11 of the Agreement. At that point,
Luna and Molina sued the Vegas and 15 UP.

III. This appeal involves 2 consolidated superior court cases in
Maricopa County: CV2022-006206 (the 2022 case) and CV2023-
092213 (the 2023 case).

A. In 2022, Luna and Molina sued the Vegas and 15 UP for
declaratory judgment as to their interest in the property.

¶6 In this appeal, Luna and Molina challenge the superior court’s
final judgment against them and in 15 UP’s favor in the 2023 case. The court
discusses the 2022 case to the extent that it affects the 2023 case because of
claim and issue preclusion.

¶7 15 UP moved to dismiss the 2022 lawsuit. The superior court
granted that motion, entered judgment against Luna and Molina, and
awarded 15 UP attorney fees and costs. Luna and Molina filed a notice of
appeal from the 2022 lawsuit judgment, but the court dismissed that appeal
because Luna and Molina abandoned it. Luna and Molina took no action to
reinstate their abandoned appeal.

1. The superior court granted 15 UP’s motion to dismiss,
saying Luna and Molina had no interest in the
property.

¶8 In the final appealable judgment in the 2022 case, the superior
court said:

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Plaintiffs [Luna and Molina] claim an equitable interest in the
Property, but no interest in the Property (equitable or
otherwise) was ever conveyed to them, as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs [Luna and Molina] received and have no interest in
the Property and have no legal basis to assert legal claims
concerning the Property against 15 UP-VW.

¶9 In that judgment, the superior court also awarded 15 UP
$32,336.00 in attorney fees and $267.75 in costs, with interest accruing at 9%
per year. Though that judgment resolved all the issues between 15 UP and
Luna and Molina, it did not resolve all claims for all parties. The superior
court thus entered that final judgment under Rule 54(b), Arizona Rules of
Civil Procedure.

2. The judgment in the 2022 case is final because Luna
and Molina did not perfect their appeal of that
judgment.

¶10 Luna and Molina filed a timely notice of appeal from the 2022
Rule 54(b) judgment. Because Luna and Molina did not pay the fee required
under A.R.S. § 12-322.A, the court deemed that appeal abandoned. See
A.R.S. § 12-322.A (“If the fee is not paid within ten days thereafter receiving
notice, the appeal shall be deemed abandoned and the record returned to
the court from which it came, and the judgment may be enforced as if no
appeal had been taken.”). Luna and Molina took no action to reinstate that
appeal.

¶11 In the meantime, Luna and Molina moved to vacate the 2022
Rule 54(b) judgment in the superior court, which the superior court denied
on January 8, 2024. Though Luna and Molina styled it as a motion under
Rule 60, the superior court considered it a motion to reconsider its summary
judgment ruling or vacate that judgment. Luna and Molina then moved for
a New Trial under Rule 59, which the superior court denied as untimely.

B. A little over 6 weeks after the superior court entered judgment
in the 2022 case, 15 UP filed the 2023 case.

¶12 Luna and Molina moved to consolidate the 2022 and 2023
cases. The superior court consolidated the 2 cases because they involved
some common issues and parties even though the superior court resolved
all claims between Luna and Molina and 15 UP. In the 2023 case, 15 UP
pursued 6 claims against Luna and Molina: judicial foreclosure, quiet title,
constructive trust/declaratory relief, special action relief under A.R.S. § 33-

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420.B/wrongful lien, ejectment from real property, and tortious
interference with contract.

¶13 15 UP moved for summary judgment on its claims against
Luna and Molina. As to Luna and Molina, the superior court granted
summary judgment in 15 UP’s favor on the breach of contract, breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing, judicial foreclosure, wrongful lien, and
ejectment.

¶14 The superior court’s summary judgment ruling did not
include monetary damages. Following the bench trial on damages, the
superior court entered a final judgment but left 2 lines blank (1 for the
award of attorney fees and 1 for the award of costs). Luna and Molina did
not provide a transcript of the bench trial.

¶15 The superior court entered that judgment on February 21,
2025. 3 weeks later, 15 UP moved to correct the oversight. On the same day,
the superior court issued a corrected final appealable judgment awarding
15 UP damages of $162,027.24, attorney fees of $49,700.00, and costs of
$2,052.59. Between the February 21, 2025 judgment and the March 14, 2025
corrected judgment, Luna and Molina filed a notice of appeal from the
February 21, 2025 judgment. On April 11, 2025, Luna and Molina timely
filed notice of appeal from the corrected March 14, 2025 judgment. See Ariz.
R. Civ. App. Proc. 9.

¶16 The court has jurisdiction over Luna and Molina’s timely
appeal in the 2023 case under Article VI, Section 9, of the Arizona
Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.1.

DISCUSSION

¶17 The court must ensure “litigants conform to an acceptable,
minimal level of competency and performance and we owe this
responsibility to the judiciary, the bar and, more importantly, to all litigants
and the people as a whole.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App.
2022) (cleaned up). The court holds Luna and Molina, self-represented
litigants, to the same standards as a lawyer and does not afford them special
leniency. Id.

¶18 Luna and Molina raise 7 issues on appeal:

1. Is the Lease void under the Agreement’s Section 12 restriction on
the Vegas’ right to assign their contractual rights: “Purchaser

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shall not transfer, sell, or assign its interest in the Property or this
Agreement without Seller’s prior written consent”?

2. Because Section 12 of the Agreement did not say the Vegas’
transfer without consent would void the transfer of any interest
the Vegas had in the Property, can 15 UP void Mr. Vega’s
assignment in the Lease?

3. Did 15 UP’s acceptance of payments from Luna and Molina
create a material issue of fact about whether 15 UP waived the
Agreement’s Section 12 restriction on the Vegas’ right to assign
their contractual rights?

4. Did the superior court err in allowing 15 UP to foreclose on the
Property and in awarding monetary damages based on the
foreclosure?

5. Did the superior court have jurisdiction to correct the judgment
to include attorney fees and costs after Luna and Molina filed
their notice of appeal?

6. Did the superior court err when it included the attorney fees and
costs awards from the March 29, 2023 final appealable judgment
in the March 14, 2025 final appealable judgment?

7. Did the superior court err in awarding attorney fees against Luna
and Molina under A.R.S. § 12-341.01 for 3 reasons: (1) Luna and
Molina are not parties to the Agreement and 15 UP is not a party
to the Lease; (2) Luna and Molina were not subject to liability
under the Agreement; (3) Luna and Molina did not breach the
Agreement?

Of the 7 issues, the first 4 fail because of claim or issue preclusion. The
remaining 3 fail for other reasons.

¶19 Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and
items in the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Villa De Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank,
FSB, 227 Ariz. 91, 94–5 ¶ 5 (App. 2011). “[I]f the facts produced in support
of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the quantum of
evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree with the
conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense[,]” then the
superior court should grant summary judgment. Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166

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Ariz. 301, 309 (1990). The court reviews a grant of summary judgment de
novo. Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Loc. No.
395 Pension Tr. Fund, 201 Ariz. 474, 482 ¶ 13 (2002).

¶20 As for damages following a bench trial, the court views the
facts in the light most favorable to upholding the judgment. Bennett v. Baxter
Grp., Inc., 223 Ariz. 414, 417 ¶ 2 (App. 2010). The court accepts the superior
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous or not supported
by substantial evidence. Davis v. Zlatos, 211 Ariz. 519, 523–24 ¶ 18 (App.
2005). The court reviews the superior court’s conclusions of law de novo.
Castro v. Ballesteros-Suarez, 222 Ariz. 48, 52 ¶ 12 (App. 2009). Because Luna
and Molina argue the evidence does not support the superior court’s
judgment, they were responsible for filing any transcripts they wanted the
court to consider. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. Proc. 11(c). They did not. They also
did not ask the court to accept a video or audio recording of the proceedings
under Rule 11(f), Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. The court
thus presumes the missing transcripts support the superior court’s ruling.
See Myrick v. Maloney, 235 Ariz. 491, 495 ¶ 11 (App. 2014).

I. Claim preclusion and issue preclusion bar the first 4 of the 7 issues
Luna and Molina raise because they abandoned their appeal in the
2022 case, so they have no interest in the Property and against 15
UP under the Agreement or the Lease.

¶21 The court reviews de novo the application of claim preclusion.
Banner Univ. Med. Ctr. Tucson Campus, LLC v. Gordon, 252 Ariz. 264, 266 ¶ 8
(2022). Claim preclusion applies when a court of competent jurisdiction
enters a judgment on the merits in an earlier case “and the matter now in
issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been,
determined in the” earlier case. Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54, 57 ¶ 7 (1999). There
must be “(1) a final judgment on the merits; and (2) a common identity of
the parties, the capacity in which they appear, the subject matter, and the
cause of action.” Matusik v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 141 Ariz. 1, 3 (App. 1984)
(cleaned up).

¶22 The court also reviews the application of issue preclusion de
novo. Hancock v. O’Neil, 253 Ariz. 509, 512 ¶ 9 (2022). Issue preclusion
“prevents a party from relitigating an issue of fact decided in a prior
judgment.” Id. ¶ 10. It prevents the following from being relitigated:

[1] an issue that was actually litigated in a previous
proceeding if [2] the parties had a full and fair opportunity
and motive to litigate the issue, [3] a valid and final

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[judgment] on the merits was entered, [4] resolution of the
issue [was] essential to the decision, and [5] the proceedings
share a common identity of the parties.

Clusiau v. Clusiau Enters., Inc., 225 Ariz. 247, 249 ¶ 9 (App. 2010)
(quotation omitted).

¶23 Luna and Molina argue they are not subject to issue or claim
preclusion. In their reply brief, they say: “It is of no moment that the 2022
case appeal aborted. There was no final judgment to be appealed.” But they
misstate the record.

¶24 The superior court entered a final appealable judgment
against Luna and Molina in the 2022 case. In that judgment, the superior
court ruled Luna and Molina had “no interest in the Property (equitable or
otherwise)” and had “no legal basis to assert legal claims concerning the
Property against 15 UP-VW.” Luna and Molina were aware it was a final
and appealable judgment because they filed a notice of appeal on April 27,
2023, which the court later deemed abandoned as of June 23, 2023. Luna
and Molina’s abandonment resulted in them permanently losing their
rights to appellate review of the superior court’s decision in the 2022 case.
See City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 4 Ariz. App. 291, 292 (1966) (“jurisdictional
requirements must be strictly complied with to achieve entrance to
appellate review.”).

¶25 Because Luna and Molina cannot relitigate their interest in the
Property or claims against 15 UP under the Agreement or the Lease, their
first 4 issues fail. First, Luna and Molina cannot challenge the enforceability
of the Agreement’s Section 12 restriction on the Vegas’ right to assign their
contractual rights. Second, they cannot challenge whether Section 12 of the
Agreement voided Mr. Vega’s transfer of his interest in the Property to
Luna and Molina under the Lease. Third, they cannot challenge the superior
court’s order in granting 15 UP’s foreclosure request because they have no
interest in the property. 1 Fourth, they cannot prevail by arguing material
issues of fact prevented the superior court from finding 15 UP did not waive
the Agreement’s anti-assignment and acceleration clauses because the
earlier judgment established 15 UP could enforce those clauses.

1 On the foreclosure issue, Luna and Molina argue it was improper. They

cite A.R.S. § 33-748. But they never identify what they believe the superior
court did wrong in the foreclosure process.

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¶26 At bottom, the judgment in the 2022 case is final, established
Mr. Vega’s purported assignment was defective, and ruled Luna and
Molina have no interest in the Property or against 15 UP under the
Agreement or the Lease. Luna and Molina thus cannot relitigate their
purported ownership interests or rights under the Agreement or Lease.

II. As to Luna and Molina’s fifth issue, the superior court had
jurisdiction to correct the February 21, 2025 final judgment under
Rule 60(a).

¶27 The superior court’s February 21, 2025 judgment in the 2023
case included 2 blank lines (1 for the award of attorney fees and 1 for the
award of costs). Around 3 weeks after the entry of judgment, the same day
15 UP moved to correct the oversight, the superior court issued the March
14, 2025 corrected judgment, awarding 15 UP damages of $162,027.24,
attorney fees of $49,700.00, and costs of $2,052.59.

¶28 Luna and Molina argue their notice of appeal from the
February 21, 2025 judgment leads to a question of the superior court’s
jurisdiction. But Luna and Molina’s March 7, 2025 notice of appeal did not
deprive the superior court of jurisdiction.

¶29 Under Rule 60(a), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, the
superior “court must correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from
oversight or omission if one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of
the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with notice.”
Though Rule 60(a) states the clerical “mistake may be corrected only with
the appellate court’s leave,” the Arizona Supreme Court clarified such relief
need not require an appellate court’s permission when it overruled Rogers
v. Ogg in U S W. Communications, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue:

We believe the reasoning of Standard Oil is compelling and
therefore adopt the rule followed in that case. We thus
overrule Roger v. Ogg insofar . . . and hold that relief under
Rule 60 from a judgment entered pursuant to an appellate
court mandate may be sought without first obtaining
permission from the appellate court.

199 Ariz. 101, 104 ¶ 11 (2000); see also Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429
U.S. 17, 97 (1976) (abandoning the rule requiring the court’s leave before
seeking relief from a clerical mistake because such a requirement is
unpersuasive).

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¶30 Rule 60(a) thus allows the superior court to correct the error
by filling in the blank lines they filed in their March 7, 2025 notice of appeal
from the February 21, 2025 judgment. The superior court issued the
February 21, 2025 judgment for 15 UP. That judgment contained blank lines.
After recognizing the error, 15 UP promptly moved to have the superior
court correct it. And the superior court did so under Rule 60(a).

¶31 The superior court thus did not err when it issued the
corrected judgment.

III. As to Luna and Molina’s sixth issue, the superior court did not err
when it included the attorney fees and costs award against the
Vegas from the 2022 case final appealable judgment in the March
14, 2025 foreclosure judgment against Luna and Molina.

¶32 In the 2022 case, the superior court entered judgment for 15
UP and against the Vegas for $32,603.75 in attorney fees and costs. The
Vegas owed 15 UP for the amount under the Agreement. For that reason,
the superior court added it to the judgment in 15 UP’s favor in the
foreclosure judgment in the 2023 case.

¶33 To begin, Luna and Molina cannot challenge the amount of
that final judgment in 15 UP’s favor and against the Vegas. Beyond that,
Luna and Molina offer only a conclusory argument and provide no legal
authority supporting their argument. They simply say the superior court
“violated the principle of res judicata with inclusion of the fees anew in the
second judgment and assumed jurisdiction it did not have as to the first fees
judgment.” (Emphasis in original.)

¶34 Longstanding precedent establishes conclusory statements,
without more, are insufficient. See Modular Sys., Inc. v. Naisbitt, 114 Ariz.
582, 587 (App. 1977); Merrill v. Wheeler, 17 Ariz. 348, 350 (1915); Adkin v.
Adkins, 39 Ariz. 530, 532 (1932); Childs v. Frederickson, 21 Ariz. 248, 249
(1920). As Modular System explained, “issues are deemed abandoned” when
an opening brief “fail[s] to state with any particularity why or how the trial
court erred” and “simply concludes that error was committed.” 114 Ariz. at
587. And here, the court is at a loss to understand how res judicata, known
as claim preclusion, applies in this context, let alone how it deprives the
superior court of jurisdiction.

¶35 Luna and Molina simply have not shown the superior court
erred when it included the 2022 case fee award in the foreclosure judgment
for the 2023 case.

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IV. As to Luna and Molina’s seventh issue, the superior court did not
err when it awarded attorney fees and costs for 15 UP and against
Luna and Molina under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

¶36 Luna and Molina argue they are not liable for attorney fees
and costs under section 12-341.01 because they were not parties to the
Agreement, did not breach the Agreement, and were merely Mr. Vega’s
assignees under the Agreement. They argue 15 UP could not prevail in a
contract matter against them because they never entered a contract with 15
UP. In doing so, they disregard their position throughout that they did have
property and other rights as Mr. Vega’s assignees under the Agreement.
They also argue 15 UP did not prevail as to them, but only as to the Vegas.

¶37 Subsection 12-341.01.A allows for an award of attorney fees
and costs “[i]n any contested action arising out of a contract.”

In any contested action arising out of a contract, express or
implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable
attorney fees. If a written settlement offer is rejected and the
judgment finally obtained is equal to or more favorable to the
offeror than an offer made in writing to settle any contested
action arising out of a contract, the offeror is deemed to be the
successful party from the date of the offer.

A.R.S. § 12-341.01.A.

¶38 The superior court has broad discretion to award and
determine the amount of attorney fees under subsection 12-341.01.A. See
Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 235 Ariz. 551, 562 ¶ 39 (App. 2014). The superior
court has similarly broad discretion when deciding who is a successful
party by considering “the totality of circumstances and the relative success
of the litigants.” McAlister v. Citibank, 171 Ariz. 207, 216 (App. 1992). And
the superior court may award attorney fees even when the parties are not
in a contractual relationship. See Buckmaster v. Dent, 146 Ariz. 521, 523 (App.
1985) (acknowledging “attorney’s fees have been awarded to parties who
have successfully proved the non-existence of a contractual relationship”).

¶39 Luna and Molina cite that quote from Buckmaster, but it does
not support their position. Buckmaster held attorney fees and costs were not
proper in that case because it “involved a rescission” based on mutual or
unilateral mistakes and the party seeking the award “drafted the language
that resulted in the rescission.” Id. at 524. Buckmaster has no application
here.

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¶40 Luna and Molina have not shown the superior court abused
its discretion when it awarded 15 UP attorney fees and costs under A.R.S. §
12-341.01.A.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

¶41 On appeal, 15 UP seeks an award for attorney fees and cost
under A.R.S. §§ 12-341.01, -1103 and 33-420. The court exercises its
discretion and awards 15 UP reasonable attorney fees and costs upon its
compliance with Rule 21, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.

CONCLUSION

¶42 The court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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